Any misgivings China may have about its exposure to the euro should be offset by a deep sense of gratitude - for it is the common currency that history may judge to be the catalyst for China's mineral - and energy - independence and indeed its very emergence as a global superpower.
More than two decades ago, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall created grounds for a more introspective Europe. The demise of a common foe and the re-emergence of a unified Germany could have focused Europe's leaders' minds to find ways to ensure the permanent alignment of Germany's interests with those of wider Europe.
In the years that followed Europe grew ever inward, building institutions and navigating its way towards a currency union, as the chosen mechanism to give shape and form to that alignment.
Whatever one's views about that currency union, its creation necessitated the strategic withdrawal of an increasingly introverted Europe from its last outposts in Africa. Why? Simply because the resources expended in extending Europe's sphere of influence into Africa needed to be re-directed towards a common internal objective: currency union. The vacuum left by Europe's departure allowed China to build its dominance in the African continent, and this may well prove to be the defining bedrock of any China-Euro-UK relationship.
What does the China-Euro-UK relationship look like now and how will it play out in 2012, a year which may define the euro?
In the immediate short to medium-term, there will be swings and roundabouts to destabilise the emerging interdependence between China, the eurozone and the UK.
China's trade with the eurozone only accounts for 6% of its international trade. Furthermore, China's status as a major creditor nation to the eurozone gives it the influence to extract geo-political gains and trade concessions from what is the world's largest integrated regional market with a GDP greater than the US.
In turn, China will likely continue to maintain a business- and investment-friendly regime to allow the UK/European private sector to profit from its large and growing domestic market.
For UK/European companies, and for their investors, two key questions bear thinking about. Firstly, how does this short-term focus on profit correlate with more durable longer-term determinants of a China-Euro-UK relationship? And secondly how to assess the risk of, and mitigate potential losses arising from, a deterioration or reversal of those short-term themes?
One place to start would be to discard the lazy options. Too many good-news stories focus disproportionately on what they report to be the benign effect of Chinese growth on UK/European companies' earnings. Not nearly enough is being done to identify the risks inherent in the transition that China appears to be navigating away from an investment-led GDP growth model towards a more domestic consumption-led one. Even less thought appears to be directed towards China's end-game - when China transitions from consumer to competitor - early signs of which are already apparent.
The single biggest risk we see to the UK-eurozone-China equation in the short-term is the risk of policy error. While this could manifest in an almost indeterminable multitude of ways, eurozone banks are a worrisome possibility. If they withdraw too much or too fast from Asia to de-leverage away from non-core markets, the resulting credit supply shortfall could adversely affect growth not only in China but in key satellite markets within China's sphere of influence. This could prompt China, in turn, to look inwards to solve regional challenges thereby reducing its ability, and indeed its willingness, to participate in a wider globally-coordinated solution to the eurozone crisis.
On the other hand, the current period of US$ strength (and consequent commodity price weakness) could potentially create opportunities. Given the Chinese Yuan peg to the US dollar, we expect stronger purchasing power of the Chinese consumer to drive demand for UK/European exports. Also, weaker commodity prices will dilute the inflation threat of which the People's Bank of China is currently seized, and potentially could prompt a reversal of the former high interest rate policy, providing a further fillip to economic activity and aggregate demand. This should be positive for UK/European exports as well as demand for sterling or euro denominated assets.
The Middle Kingdom is an inaccurate translation of the native name for China - Zhong guo, literally, the kingdom at the centre of the cosmos. And although this China-centricity has been lost in translation over the years, its place within the macro-economic and geo-political commentary of corporate, investment and military-historical strategists needs to be re-affirmed. A proper understanding of China's long-term strategy remains as vital as it is inscrutable.
Any views expressed within this article are our current in house views as of 3 February 2012 and should not be relied upon as fact and could be proved wrong. In particular, no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of any financial information set out or as to the potential for achievement or reasonableness of any forecasts, projections, prospects or returns is made.