2013-05-23T12:56:31-04:00 James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/author/index.php?author=james-denselow Copyright 2008, HuffingtonPost.com, Inc. HuffingtonPost Blogger Feed for James Denselow Good old fashioned elbow grease. tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.2790433 2013-03-04T17:32:24-05:00 2013-05-04T05:12:01-04:00

James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/
Living in Syria in the period 2005-2007, one was always struck by the blatant contradictions that characterised Assad's rule. In the jasmine-scented alleyways of the Old City of Damascus you never felt threatened by criminality and away from the bustle of the Souk there was a pervading sense of peacefulness -- yet this was a country living in a seemingly infinite state of emergency, with feared secret police forces and infamous prisons. If you wanted to find out about the workings of the State or the actions of its government the very last place you'd go is the Ministry of Information. State newspapers would seemingly report anything but the news. The country was technically at war with Israel but the Golan had been quiet for decades, with tourists to the town of Quneitra treated to an experience similar to visiting a museum rather than a potential flashpoint on the border of contested occupied territory. Beyond the facade of elections Government Ministers and Parliamentarians were mouthpieces for Assad and the Shadow State that kept his regime in power. The ubiquitous poster of Bashar and his father watched down on you everywhere you went -- Big Brother was indeed watching you.

Bashar is perhaps the ultimate product of his own father's Orwellian system where black is white, right is wrong and the mass slaughter of your own people is the legitimate defence of the realm against international conspiracy. Characterised as the quintessential patriot; a quiet, unassuming, professional healer, Bashar supposedly reluctantly returned to Syria in 1994 to prepare for rule after the death of his older brother. Yet today he has become welded to the regime which in turn remains in a deadly and perhaps fatal embrace with the Syrian state.

The son has crossed the Rubicon and has left behind the suffocating authoritarianism of 'peacetime' rule in favour of the tactics of a winner-takes-all fight to the death in the 'war on terror' he sees himself fighting. A conflict that started with the arrest and torture of children in March 2011 has escalated into a fight that brings into question Syria's continued existence as a viable state. Today the regime is literally going ballistic having made the decision that firing SCUD missiles at its biggest city makes tactical sense. Human Rights Watch reported in February that "at least four ballistic missiles that struck populated areas in the city of Aleppo and a town in Aleppo governorate during the week of February 17, 2013. The attacks killed more than 141 people, including 71 children, and caused immense physical destruction."

The regime's tactics of self-destruction of course predate the decision to use weapons that have wiped out square blocks of residential housing. We've seen a steady gradation in the use of force from tear gas and small arms to barrel bombs rolled from aircraft and trenches dug around districts before they are hammered with artillery. Increasingly heavy stand-off weapons have been complimented by the most intimate of killing chronicled in the hundreds of videos released as part of perhaps the world's first "YouTube Civil War." Soldiers have captured rebels and used their mobiles to phone their mothers who then hear them being tortured and shot. Skinned bodies with genitalia removed are returned to their families, people are buried alive or massacred with knives. 75 percent of Syria's hospitals are either partially or completely destroyed, conservative estimates tell of $11 billion worth of damage to the rest of the country's infrastructure, the economy is steadily collapsing, close to a million people have fled the country, almost 20 percent of the population have been forced from their homes, cases of typhoid and hepatitis A are rising, there is no end in sight.

Bashar has evolved from an Orwellian Big Brother to a figure akin to Joseph Conrad's Kurtz whose only strategy is to "exterminate all the brutes." The introduction of ballistic missiles into the conflict will of course raise debate around the prospect of chemical weapon use being around the corner. March does not only bring the 2nd year anniversary of the Syria conflict it marks twenty-five years since the Halabja massacre where poisoned gas killed up to 5,000 Iraqi Kurds. As we continue to digest the 'horror' unleashed by the regime to date we should be under no illusions of what could come next and what Syria's Kurtz is capable of.

@jamesdenselow]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.1698147 2012-07-24T10:59:11-04:00 2012-09-23T05:12:09-04:00

James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/
The limited access of independent media has meant that much of the conflict has been communicated through social media; panicked YouTube clips and horror stories from Facebook. The lack of information from the country has resulted in several innovative attempts to communicate events here in the UK with "66 Minutes in Damascus" giving Londoners a vision of being under Syrian detention based on a series of first-hand accounts. Likewise The Fear of Breathing takes the increasingly popular verbatim format to the stage at the intimate Finborough Theatre in Chelsea.

The play attempts to tell the story of the revolution to date. It starts with idealistic youngsters full of hopeful imagination for a peaceful transition. Students, radio DJs, hotel owners and the ubiquitous 'activists' innocently speak of the "Facebook revolution" and their networked organisation of demonstrations and protests. In a country where previously it was illegal for more than seven people to gather the political oxygen that was blowing across the region is intoxicating and infectious, told well by the energetic performers who interesting largely choose to speak in Welsh and Scottish accents rather than attempt an Arabic impression.

The stories were gathered covertly by theatre director Zoe Lafferty and two journalists who'd travelled covertly into the country. The single outstanding personal tale is that of Quataba, a twenty-two year old student, who gets picked up by the security forces. His subsequent torture makes for uncomfortable viewing, although it still appears bizarre that he was asked 'how many facebook friends do you have?' by his sadistic captors. Meanwhile a hotel owner in Damascus provides the counter-narrative of fear of the unknown that would follow the demise of the regime. His comfort and success in business, not to mention his love of sushi, is all at risk in the uncertainty of a 'new Syria'.

Sectarianism is an underlying theme throughout, with a particularly sad moment coming when the tortured student promises revenge against his former captors. The verbatim format works generally well, although at one point a Syrian FSA fighter appears to deliver a lecture whilst ducking and diving from incoming fire which appears unlikely. It would have also been interesting to understanding why these particular characters were chose for their stories, as one says "this is the first time I've told my story in English".

The Fear of Breathing is a brave and important contribution to better understanding the darkness that is continuing to envelope Syria.

James Denselow is a writer on Middle Eastern politics. Originally published for the London Magazine]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.1674073 2012-07-16T04:22:15-04:00 2012-09-14T05:12:02-04:00

James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/ "The Battle for the Arab Spring - Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the making of a new era"

(Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, Yale University Press, 2012)

Reuters correspondent Lin Noueihed and Middle East analyst Alex Warren have written an comprehensive account of the revolution and counter-revolution underpinning the Arab Spring over a year after its inception.

The book attempts the ambitious feat of investigating the origins of the Arab Spring, the particular dynamics of the 'battleground' states as well as the more subtle geopolitics and identity politics that provide the arena in which events have taken place.

The authors trace the origins of the Arab Spring to before the 2011 'explosion', chronicling the wave of protests that swept the region in 2008 in response to rocketing food prices. The roots of the feelings of injustice felt by millions is covered widely and surmised effectively in a chapter entitled "Bread, Oil and Jobs", where words like 'malaise', 'frustrations' and 'corruption' dominate. A particularly well-made argument explores why other economically disadvantaged areas have not reacted in the same manner as the Middle East and North Africa region, making the persuasive point that "perhaps the key difference in the Arab world was the combination of economic hopelessness with political powerlessness" (p.42).

The Arab Spring at the core of its explosion was a well networked population rejecting the legitimacy of the 'owners' of the state. What makes the timing of "The Battle for the Arab Spring" particularly interesting is that it can comment on the counter-revolution that followed the heady optimism that came with the rapid fall of Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi. With each of the 'battleground' states getting an assessment of the likelihood of the revolutions' success.

Tunisia comes out as the most successful to date with "an educated population and active population" and "a long history as a state" (p.94). The prospects are less rosy in Egypt where the authors look back a year to what they describe as a "protest inspired coup" (p.99) that could be only "half completed" (p.113). The current battle between the newly elected President Morsi and the military authorities whose "establishment that had not only provided all the presidents since the overthrow of the monarchy sixty years earlier" (p.111) could have numerous consequences against an increasingly bleak economic climate. The focus on the fate of Coptic Christians (10% of the Egyptian population) in 'post-revolutionary' Egypt should be of particular concern. The managing of expectations around the Arab Spring remain at their most uncertain with Egypt where the book makes the succinct point that "if the first stage of the revolution took eighteen days, the next will take years, if not decades" (p.133).

Whereas 'bread and freedom' lay behind much of Egypt and Tunisia's revolutions, the spirit of change swept into Bahrain a country where a "history of activism" had been created by a Sunni monarchy ruling over a majority Shi'ite country. Within Bahrain's uprising the book touches upon the multilayered nature of the Arab Spring, whereby new dynamics interact with existing conflicts. Perhaps most complex of all is the 'Cold War' between Iran and Saudi Arabia and how it manifests itself in sectarian terms. Whilst Warren and Noueihed chronicle the challenges facing the Arab monarchies and have a chapter that stands alone debating meaning and application of 'Islamism', the reader feels slightly short changed that the Saudi-Iranian conflict wasn't described as a clearer arena within which much of the battleground states are directed.

Libya's "revolution from above" is outlined in a powerful chapter that puts at its beginning the ramifications of this 'new phase' of the Arab Spring that would see tens of thousands of people killed (between 30,000 and 50,000 were killed in the six months after the NATO intervention). Unfortunately the book fails to unearth the catalyst that turned peaceful marches into such a deadly armed insurrection and perhaps places too much emphasis on the role of Bernard-Henri Levy in the NATO decision to intervene. The chapter paints a bleak future for the new militia ridden post-Gaddafi Libya, speculating that "it will be almost impossible for the new government not to inherit the way that Gaddafi distributed power between different groups. It is the only means of holding the country together through a long transitional period" (p.189).

Syria is likely to remain at the centre of global attention for some time. The book provides a nuanced look at the urban-rural divides that would drive much of the early protests. The authors accept the Western bloc consensus that Bashar will go but how long it will take and how many will die is unknown, a powerful quote from a Syrian protester sums this up "it's like faith in God, once you stop believing, you can't go back" (p.229).

The book concludes by recognising that the Arab Spring is by no means over and that the notion of any regime being "too big to fail" is obsolete. The overall scope and breadth of the work makes it deserving of special recognition. The authors personal experiences are combined well with a riveting narrative that plays especially well in chronicling the 'battleground states'. Less successful is the attempt to overlay the aspects of both Islamism and various geopolitical dynamics to create a more coherent structure, although perhaps this is inevitable considering the scale and unique differences across such a vast and diverse region.

Originally reviewed for International Affairs]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.1580135 2012-06-08T12:37:43-04:00 2012-08-08T05:12:10-04:00

James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/ Sectarianism in Iraq (Fanar Haddad, Hurst, London 2011) is a timely examination of a under-researched and controversial topic that continues to play a central role in shaping the future of the country.

The book's stated aim is to provide the first concerted attempt to analyze the nature of sectarian relations and identities in Iraq. It focuses on how sectarian identities are negotiated on a societal level and addresses the vacuum in study on a topic that Haddad describes as being viewed as an odious "taboo" or reduced to oversimplified notions, such as all Shi'a were against Saddam and all Sunnis were for him. Paradoxically avoiding debate on the topic has allowed it to become far more dangerous, as Saleem Muttar argues that "overemphasizing a unifying Iraqi identity at the expense of understanding sectarian differences has had a detrimental effect on social cohesion."

How a society can transition from cohesion to civil war and back to a nominal understanding is the central narrative of the work. The book makes for particularly interesting reading while the situation in Syria continues to unravel along not such dissimilar lines. Haddad's point about totalitarian regimes not allowing for "counter-narratives or sub-national solidarities to be aired in public" is universal. Both in Iraq and Syria any questioning of the central national narrative is described as a form of conspiracy or foreign plot. There is also the notion that Assad and Saddam's 'secular' authoritarianism is a buffer against a religious takeover of the state, although Esposito and Voll make the cogent point that "the most effective opposition to authoritarian regimes is expressed through a reaffirmation of the Islamic identity and heritage".

Haddad's theoretical centre piece is the notion that "contrary to conventional wisdom, religious / sectarian identity and national identity should not be viewed as mutually exclusive definitions of the Iraqi self." The theory section is somewhat clunky but the most original and important part of the book. Haddad argues that even at the height of the 2006-2008 Civil War period, Iraqis of all sects continued to claim to be fighting in that 'national' interest. The author also points out that the words 'Sunni' and 'Shi'a' were "seldom used in Iraqi public discourse until the 1990s."

Haddad outlines how a perfect equilibrium between state and sectarian nationalism, that overlaps into both sects, allows for a peaceful balance whereas when state nationalism adopts the position of one sect over another it leads to sectarian tensions and often a violent clash. In essence then an understanding of Sunni-Shi'a divisions in Iraq is a "conflict between contradictory myth-symbol complexes revolving around the symbolism and cultural ownership of the nation-state".

The book argues that 1991 "was perhaps the most significant turning point in sectarian relations in twentieth-century Iraq" and the "decade that altered Iraqi society for generations to come." However, Haddad's work is weakest when he moves away from a tight focus on a sectarian analysis to a more general historical narrative. Indeed readers wanting to get their teeth into the sanctions era would be far better off reading Joy Gordon's Invisible War.

The open-ended and contemporary nature of the post-2003 period makes Haddad analysis of it relatively weaker and reliant on the transcripts of speeches or media appearances, a point the author admits. However the central theory of sectarian tension as a result of state nationalism moving from a Sunni to Shi'a centric narrative still holds.

It is this fascinating constant recalibration of sectarian identities that provides a crucially important framework to better understanding Iraq. Haddad should be applauded for not only opening the door on further research on the subject but also for killing off the taboo hanging over sectarianism. With Syria particularly in mind, shining the light on the relationship between sectarianism and nationalism is a key factor it mitigating and managing potential conflict, something that denying its relevance fails to do.

Originally reviewed for International Affairs ]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.1555992 2012-05-30T11:16:20-04:00 2012-07-30T05:12:13-04:00

James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/
When will we arrive at a tipping point in Syria? This is the frequently asked question that followed the early momentum of the uprising in 2011, the bloody siege of Baba Amr in March, the double suicide bombing in Damascus and the bloody massacre of children and civilians in Hula in May.

Despite the lack of access for international media the outside world cannot claim to be ignorant of what is happening in the country. True the details are murky and there remain huge questions of whom/what the Shabiha are and the extent of Al Qaeda penetration, but more or less the daily toll of bloodshed is known both in figures and horrific stories. Behind the main headlines I've seen videos of people buried alive by men in army uniforms, heard stories of skinned bodies being returned to terrified relatives and attended events where various members of the opposition talk of the desperate plight that sections of the Syrian population are enduring.

Despite a brief lull when the Annan plan was launched the violence has steadily increased and the notion that the cease fire is holding is a tragic testimony to international impotence towards the conflict. Like climate change the vast majority of the global population know that what is going on is bad, but the mechanisms of international governance, and in particular the United Nations charged with the 'responsibility to protect', simple cannot respond.

The Annan plan is like the Kyoto Treaty, the best and only game in town but completely unsuited for the scale of what it is trying to address. The world's major powers are trapped in a comfortable inertia. The Europeans and the Americans are happy to make diplomatic gestures, like throwing out Syrian Ambassadors, and talking about how the Assad regime has lost legitimacy, but their biggest effort to unite the Syrian opposition remains half-baked to say the least. The Chinese and the Russians meanwhile, still smarting from being conned on Libya UNSCR 1973 and with deep strategic and economic ties with Syria, are stonewalling any movement at the United Nations.

Yet even if the Russians and Chinese unblocked the UN route, the US administration, along with NATO, has ruled out military intervention. The US is in an election year and is hugely war weary, whilst the Europeans simply don't have the resources in the age of austerity to commit to what would likely be a longer and far more bloody operation that the one to remove Gaddafi.

Put simply even if the Syria opposition, united and with proven legitimacy with an acceptable post-Assad transition plan, requested military intervention it is very unlikely to come from the US or Europe. French President Francois Hollande's statements over potential military intervention are only made in the full knowledge that the Russians will never let it actually happen.

Meanwhile the Syrian regime is analogous to the most extreme form of climate change deniers. There are too many instances of this to mention but I was struck by the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister claim on Tuesday that "Syria has not committed a single violation of Annan's plan". The regime feels comfortable with a divided international community that lacks the willpower to get involved. After all Ba'athist Syria is a country that has survived significant isolation and sanctions in the past, it even had its Embassy chucked out of the country after the Hindawi Affair in 1986.

Reports suggest that 15,000 have died in Syria to date, that number could increase to 30,000 by the end of the year and there are no reasons to think that events similar to the Hula massacre could be repeated again and again and again.

Beyond the bravery of those who continued to resist the regime, many are looking for creative and determined action from Turkey and the Gulf states. Otherwise we may find ourselves in the 'Silver Bullet' period that characterised policy towards Iraq between 1991-2003. Here, behind a shield of sanctions that devastated the civilian population of Iraq, Washington and its allies hoped that a senior military figure could kill Saddam and take over the reins of the state. Interestingly enough when discussing such a scenario and tipping points is hearing what the Syrian consul general in California, Hazem Chehabi, had to say following his defection from the regime this week: "you get to a point where your silence, or inaction, becomes ethically or morally unacceptable. The recent barbaric massacre that took place in Houla, for me was a tipping point".

With the international system in a comfortable gridlock we may have to look in more unlikely places for something to change the current bloody dynamic in Syria.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.1468734 2012-05-01T16:05:03-04:00 2012-07-01T05:12:24-04:00

James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/ Revolt: Eye-Witness to the Syrian Uprising

One of the biggest challenges to understanding events in Syria over the past year has been the lack of access granted to the international media. The secretive nature of the Syrian state has allowed only for controlled and largely regulated trips or dangerous illegal travel into the rebel held areas of the country. The deaths of Marie Colvin and Remi Ochlik, killed by government rockets in Homs in February, was a brutal reminder of the perils of trying to ensure that the reality of events reaches the global audience. Although Stephen Starr cannot be said to have taken the same risks as Colvin, 'Revolt' is still a brave account written by someone who knows Syria and has been there since the outbreak of protests and violence in March 2011. Starr had the privileged position of working as an editor for the state controlled "Syria Times", an English language excuse for a paper riddled with systemic corruption and nepotism that would lazily report the banal and irrelevant, unsurprisingly focusing on the President's day to day activities. The standards of the paper are typical of the independence and quality of Syria's press, I once knew another Western journalist whose attempts to persuade the Times staff that Syrian forces weren't withdrawing to the west in their 2005 withdrawal from Lebanon (i.e into the sea) was met was uninterested stubbornness.

Starr's access to Syria as a Irish journalist has led to a demand for his writing from papers such as the Sunday Times, Washington Post and the LA Times. There is huge value in the thoughts and stories of someone who has been there for four years rather than the instant impressions of shorter and more controlled trips. Little gems like picking up on the increase in the price of milk (44 to 55 Syrian Pounds) and noticing subtle changes to numbers of police of the streets are exactly the kind of detail denied in most Syria reporting. However it is only made clear how he was allowed to stay in the country for as long as he did at the end of the book, which I think is a mistake as understanding this is central. Journalism during this time in Syria (and perhaps at all times) requires in Starr's words an "exercise in patience, judgement and nerve-control", crucially the author is honest that he can only report things as he sees them.

The book therefore is not a strictly objective look at Syria during this time, indeed many of the witnesses that provide the thread of anecdotal stories are Starr's friends. The book is more a personal tale yet emotions are more or less kept in check albeit for the sense of anger at people's willingness to ignore the reality around them, relief about moving beyond Syria's authoritarian reach to Jordan and journalistic envy when famous international correspondents arrive. The work tells not of the up close brutality that Colvin reported before her death but rather the banality of evil that has underpinned the regime for decades, the insidious control that leads people to refer to the violence as "the situation" and to engage in what the author refers to as "mass self-delusion" where people abandon their critical faculties.

The author admits that the work is Damascus-focused where "on the surface life continued much as normal" despite a raft of subtle changes including increases in petty crime. This would eventually change as RPG attacks and suicide bombings burst the Damascus bubble. The book provides a nuanced look into the protest movements and how it spread "like an unstoppable electric charge, the protest movement moved from town to town, from disaffected family to family, from brutalised neighbourhood to neighbourhood and from rumour to reality for so many Syrians". Starr partially dissects the Local Coordinating Committees, the grassroots engine of much of the protest, but ignores any deep analysis of the 'Free Syria Army' (FSA) or the 'Syrian National Council' (SNC). The important sectarian makeup of both pro and anti regime groups is affirmed as are subtleties such as the majority's sudden about-turn and rejection of Al Jazeera's reporting. The author muses that while the "majority were frozen by fear", that may change when people are affected by the government repression and have family or friends killed, injured or arrested. The regime's tactics of isolating and then applying extreme violence to places like Baba Amr appear to support this hypothesis. The regime is aware that it cannot placate those who are acting against them in revenge so instead they focus on quarantining and then destroying the protesters. In the case of Homs this involved actually building a trench around restive districts and cutting off water and electricity while using a controlled media to persuade or scare the silent majority into not getting involved.

The book is far more than a simple focus on the clash between the regime and the protestors, it explores, from a non-academic perspective, the fundamental debates that define modern Syria, from dichotomies of state and society, urban and rural, rich and poor, ethnic and sectarianism which all contribute towards an overall narrative of suppressed discontent which is essential for understanding what fuelled anger in the first place. The fact that 'poor towns' such as Deraa, Douma and Jisr al-Shaghour became hotbeds of revolt is juxtaposed with the Baath party's original credentials as the 'party of the poor'. There is no small irony that Bashar himself has been responsible for weakening Baath party controls in the interests of opening up. He achieved this by undermining the bedrock of his father's coup-proof state by marginalizing the old guard, introducing communications technology and the internet to the country, reducing funding to the military, removing the local power of Baath party committees and the unions, and, in pursuing his version of the 'Chinese model' of economic reform, exacerbating class differences and forcing large sections of Syrian society to rely on more traditional tribal and sectarian networks.

Starr's wide ranging social networks create an interesting portrait of the Syrian youth. There is no simple narrative to this the vast and discontented section of Syrian society. Starr meets both protestors and those content to live in a alcohol and party-fuelled denial, enjoying $12 drinks in funky Damascus bars. Crucially he identifies that a "lack of respect for the country's youth and the lack of prospects for the future are what have kept the uprising alive". Yet goes further into addressing the seeming paradox that while the youth realise that the 'system' in Syria is broken that doesn't automatically translate into a desire for regime change or a hatred of Bashar.

The book is an important contribution to the hugely stifled subject of Syria despite Starr's journalistic inexperience often showing with ten words used when one will do, in addition his constant references to meeting friends grates. Nevertheless his analysis of the workings of the regime and the demands and divisions in Syrian society demonstrate a excellent knowledge of the country, which is combined to create a rare and thorough eyewitness perspective of the events of the past year.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.1419962 2012-04-12T08:13:07-04:00 2012-06-12T05:12:01-04:00

James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/
The film has been fairly compared to the Transformers trilogy and is complete with sweeping shots of military hardware and a US flag is never too long out of shot. The film's central character is a boozy, long-haired lay about living on his older brother's sofa until he finds the solution to his life's problems - joining the navy! One short haircut later he finds himself in a snazzy uniform with access to large weapons, a stunning fiancée on his arm and put in charge of ordering Rihanna about, a classic teenage fantasy.

To aid the not so subtle recruitment nudge the actors were sent on a Navy boot camp overseen by retired Captain Rick Hoffman, who after issuing sage advice such as "don't fall off the boat", was given a cameo in the film. Canadian actor Taylor Kitsch, who plays Lt. Alex Hopper bigged up his experience with the Navy telling the media that "when you're working in Pearl Harbour and surrounded by all these vets and naval officers, it's quite infectious and so you're taking from whatever they're giving you."

Director Peter Berg admitted that he was "a big fan of the Navy and I wanted to do a Navy film." The film, which isn't in danger of winning too many Oscars, has even sparked debates on military forums about whether battleships could return to frontline service. In addition the film's other unusual heroes are Navy veterans in their 80s and 90s who were located via veterans' administrations. They provided the crew of the Missouri Battleship that save the day and Berg spoke of how "there were about forty of them, and they just had the time of their life. They were hitting on the girls, and flirting and drinking beer and telling stories, and they had more energy than anyone".

What is most interesting about the film however is its portrayal of veteran soldiers. In particular one of the films central hero's is injured US Army Colonel, Greg Gadson, who lost both of his legs in Baghdad. Brooklyn Decker plays a physiotherapist and spent time at Brooks Army Medical Hospital in Texas before acting the role. Rather than avoiding the thorny issue of the long term wounded the film takes Gadson's character into the centre of the action as he issues the rallying cry "let's see if we can buy the world another day!" before attacking an alien, at one point using his prosthetic leg as a club.

Although Battleship may be quickly forgotten amongst the glut of summer blockbusters, its portrayal of veterans may find it more memorable for recruits to the Navy both past, present and of course future.
]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.1307939 2012-02-28T17:45:47-05:00 2012-04-29T05:12:01-04:00

James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/
In the interests of creative thinking I suggest that there are a series of interesting parallels with the original Star Wars trilogy (episodes IV-VI) can provide a practical narrative of understanding.

This may appear a little bizarre but it is worth remembering that the original Star Wars films chronicled the story of a hero who represents a crucially important demographic component of what would form the Arab Spring's revolutionary vanguard. Indeed Luke Skywalker was a under-employed young graduate, living at home with high expectations for his future not being met by the Empire's lack of attention to the provincial backwater where he lived. As the Observer's Henry Porter explained, "youth unemployment and the grinding lack of hope are the source of the most serious social and political problems across the Arab world. The unemployment rate among Tunisians under 25 is about 26%. Half of the 60,000 graduates released on to the jobs market every year will not find work".

Skywalker would ultimately be responsible for the destruction of Empire's most fearsome weapon largely due to secret official documents being smuggled to the rebels that he joined. Although it cannot be said to be of the same impact, the smuggled official secret US diplomatic cables, revealed in the Wikileaks documents, highlighted cases of massive corruption in the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes. As the US Ambassador in Tunis wrote "whether it's cash, services, land, property, or yes, even your yacht, President Ben Ali's family is rumoured to covet it and reportedly gets what it wants".

Of course Skywalker had originally opted not to join the rebellion, it was the murder of his uncle and aunt by the Empire that triggered his quest for revenge. In Syria the continued protests have been maintained by a 'momentum of martyrdom', whereby funerals in particular have been used as rallying points for further protest. The use of disproportionate force in an attempt to scare opposition into submission was a common tactic used by all the dictatorial regimes, but as with the Empire's willingness to destroy entire planets it only succeeded in consolidated hatred against the regimes.

Yet the most important parallel to be made is the euphoria that surrounded the destruction of the Death Star, in parallel to the excitement that came with the fall of the dictators in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, and the corresponding disappointment about what came next. Indeed in Episode V - The Empire Strikes Back - the Empire showed that despite having its centrepiece weapon destroyed it remained a potent force. In the case of the Middle East and North Africa region in 2012 the state is fighting back. The most obvious and brutal case of this is the current siege of cities in Syria, where the disproportionate balance of power could be said to compare to the Battle of Hoth one-sidedness. While in Egypt the dictator has gone but his military-industrial infrastructure remains.

The message is that despite the incredible rate of change over 2011 people must taper their expectations and be aware that there is a long way to go until the Arab revolutions can truly be said to have succeeded. Of course there is the Libyan exception where the rebels have already won their civil war, but what is happening since - a fragile post-conflict country with significant divisions and challenges to be addressed - was never shown in Star Wars. Instead the trilogy chose to finish on the moment of complete victory rather than focus on the complex and potentially dangerous aftermath.
]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.1230215 2012-01-25T19:00:00-05:00 2012-03-26T05:12:01-04:00

James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/
This conclusion was reached in a new paper written by Tim Eaton who currently works for BBC Media Action on media development projects in the Middle East. The paper is the product of over a year of research and seeks to analyze the use of online activism in the Egyptian uprisings of January and February 2011, drawing out the lessons learned in addition to applying them to the wider context of the Arab Spring.

It suggests the following key findings:

Online activism multiplied the impact of social protest in Egypt: it made political action easier, faster and more universal. In the tightly controlled Egyptian political space, social media enabled activists to circumnavigate the regime's repressive structures to convince Egyptians in the online world into taking action in the offline one. This was its main success, for a revolution will always be won and lost on the streets.

The political uses of online platforms and technologies are extremely transferrable, and are just as clearly seen in the London riots as they were in Tahrir. The first use is as a tool for mobilising citizens by producing material designed to inspire them into action, and to organise their action once recruited. The second is to use online platforms as a medium for citizen journalism to report on the situation.

To maximise the impact of online protest it is clear that the combination of the above catalytic and scrutinizing uses is required. But the ability to do so is determined by an array of factors, including the domestic political environment and levels of internet penetration, affordability and computer literacy. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the deployment of such uses has varied across the region.

The use of online activism in Egypt and the wider Arab world has led to the growth of a new kind of political movement that reflects the plural nature of social media. This has enabled a flat leadership model that is difficult for autocratic regimes to combat: such movements are strong in the face of government interference as they are not dependent on a strong hierarchical structure to coordinate their activities.

In the Egyptian uprisings, social media became a major hub of political activity. In the advocacy of street protest, over 400,000 people were signed up on Facebook. Moreover, throughout the protests Egyptian Facebook users believed that 85 percent of Facebook usage was to organize activism, raise awareness and spread information about events. Analysis of Twitter also illustrates the extent to which the conversation was driven by political events, with mentions of the hashtag #jan25 correlating closely with total Tweet volumes.

Online mediums have proved a potent tool for pro democracy elements in the Arab world. Yet, the gains of the activists remain as reversible as they were hard fought. In Egypt, their efforts have still yet to secure a true transition of power, and the online activists of Tahrir are unlikely to become major actors in the new Egyptian parliament. Meanwhile, the Syrian opposition has yet to succeed in bringing down the regime of Bashar al Asad. Indeed, if the work of the online activists is to be supported effectively, it is imperative that its significance is better understood if it is to help prevent the Arab world's spring from turning to autumn.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.1204147 2012-01-17T13:50:00-05:00 2012-03-18T05:12:01-04:00

James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/ The Leaderless Revolution -- How Ordinary People Will Take Power and Change Politics in the 21st Century (Carne Ross, Simon & Schuster, 2011)

Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere -- The New Global Revolutions (Paul Mason, Verso, 2012)

Frequently described as a "high-flying former diplomat," Carne Ross resigned from the Foreign Office over the Iraq War. Being so close to mechanisms of power provided him with an understanding which ultimately shook his belief in our national and international systems of government. Indeed the author admits that he does not come up with his arguments 'by way of academic study, or historical research. I know this because I once did it.' Ross' earlier work, Independent Diplomat , was an exorcism of his institutional past while his latest effort is a far more ambitious attempt to outline a better future for global governance.

Ross, now running his own diplomatic consultancy, has transformed into a thinking man's neo-anarchist whose book outlines both the failures of representative democracy in the era of globalisation and ways in which empowered individuals can succeed in the future. The author's central point revolves around the failure of institutions to meet peoples aspirations. While global surveys confirm that while people prefer democracy, as Ross puts it 'they are less and less happy with the practice of democratic government.' The nation-state represents an archaic and ill-fitting answer to multifaceted non-localized issues, brought on by the pressures of globalisation and climate change. From flu-epidemics, to the spread of rioting, he carefully plots the ways in which our interconnectedness has led to problems which require global cooperation to solve. Yet the best efforts at multilateral cooperation have yet to deliver the answers. Ross parallels the enormous rhetoric of the 2005 G8's promise to 'make poverty history' with the reality of its 'utter failure' to do so with a shortfall in pledges of $20 billion.

The spine of his "nine-point manifesto" is the concept of anarchism. Ross traces its political conception to dispel the images of violent and balaclava-clad anarchists who are responsible for a largely false picture of the true movement. Rather than a chaos-filled power vacuum, he envisages a gradual shift towards self-organized systems which he argues are best for the 21st century. Ross argues that 'if people do not have responsibility,' then we should not 'expect them to behave responsibly,' while observing the ultimate paradox of well-meaning government that the more it 'seeks to act to tackle particular problems, the less that individuals are likely to feel responsible for them.' The power of human agency is fundamental to his argument; "do stuff for yourself rather than asking a government or others to do it; address political concerns directly to those in power; use nonviolent methods and always act as if the means are the end; and embody the political principles you're trying to promote." Ross uses the case study of the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre to highlight his belief that sustained participatory or deliberative democracy shows that 'better outcomes result when citizens are directly involved in decisions over their own lives.' The author argues that the systems of domestic and international governance will continue to prevail until 'those in whose name they claim to function withdraw their consent.'

The withdrawal of consent from the hegemonic modes of governance would appear to be the ultimate barometer of the success of Ross's Leaderless Revolution. However the author fails to explain how a global consciousness going beyond "what we don't want" to articulate and promote "what we do -- the change we want to see" might actually emerge. Both the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement, defining events of 2011, have demonstrated that, in this case, rejecting authoritarian rule and modern capitalism has not in itself resulted in a fundamentally different global dynamic. Ross is correct that if the elites don't address existing imbalances then the people will act; "The less people have agency -- control -- over their own affairs, and the less command they feel over their futures and their circumstances, the more inclined they are to take to the street." Yet the author admits that 'the world is complicated; it requires professionals to sort it out.' Ross makes the excellent point that when Barack Obama promised to 'change politics,' galvanizing millions across America, he meant to change things himself as the president, not the masses, 'government is not about mass collective action, only getting someone elected is.'

Paul Mason's Why It's All Kicking Off Everywhere is an equally ambitious attempt to provide a journalistic account of the underpinnings behind the revolutions and protest movements of the past few years. The book is an extended edition of a blog post that went viral and Mason is far more positive about the role of technology, what he defines as his 'technological-determinist approach' than Ross. Indeed Ross makes the powerful argument that technology can detach people from one another and the more detached they are, 'the more they can cloak themselves in anonymity and be shielded from the consequences of their views, the more violent, hostile and irresponsible they are likely to be.' Mason is far more comfortable with 'social media's power to present unmediated reality.' Indeed his main argument is that modern technology has allowed 'networked individuals' to overcome collective institutions which are unfit for purpose, in essence that 'a network can usually defeat a hierarchy.' These networks of organisation led to security services in Tunisia and Egypt being bypassed by protestors.

Mason agrees with Ross that 'we are in the middle of a revolution: something wider than a pure political overthrow and narrower than the classic social revolutions of the twentieth century.' He sees the ingredients for this revolution as a combination of the 'radicalized, secular-leaning youth; a repressed workers' movement with considerable social power; uncontrollable social media and the restive urban poor.' Although global in nature there are significant differences in its success, in UK for example there has been a 'crisis' of protestors as 'students got wrapped up in exams; the trade unions began negotiations over pensions; the small group of activists behind UK Uncut went into a defensive huddle; and the anarchists engaged in mutual recrimination.'

However, the book poses more questions than it does answers and can be guilty of trying a bit too hard to be in touch with 21st century living in Mason's half-baked attempt to accredit Twitter users and constant reference to iPods and Lady Gaga. Yet beneath this enjoyable journalistic veneer is the critical heart of Mason's argument that while technology has allowed empowered individuals to overthrow authoritarian governments, globalisation itself may fail as the economics of the financial crisis of 2008 continue to unravel, something better explained in his earlier book Meltdown. Both Ross and Mason's accounts are important contributions to the new age of thinking that is rapidly emerging as a consequence of the crisis of globalized capitalism.

@jamesdenselow]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.1165016 2011-12-22T09:20:00-05:00 2012-02-21T05:12:02-05:00

James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/
Soft, unprotected civilian targets were hit by co-ordinated, simultaneous attacks that were likely planned prior to Shi'a Prime Minister Maliki's Monday decision to order the arrest of Sunni Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi. The Western press has focused on the potential for larger sectarian bloodletting, the reality is that this bombing fits into a fairly predictable pattern of violence that has been largely ignored by the media. Indeed the average monthly death toll in Iraq exceeds 300 and kidnappings, bombings and shootings are daily occurrences.

The Iraqi security forces are now some 650,000 strong and according to US military trainers becoming more competent by the day. With this in mind a combination of manpower, equipment and checkpoints (in addition to reconciliation efforts that I will come onto) have reduced the frequency of attacks against religious sites and ceremonies, government institutions and in particular against the security forces themselves.

Instead Al Qaeda and disenfranchised groups have focused on less frequent but more deadly attacks. In the wake of multiple bombings, including two suicide attacks, in the capital on 12 October, Major General Qasim al-Musawi, spokesman for Baghdad Operations Command, told the Associated Press: "Every three months or so, Al-Qaeda mobilises all its resources to launch such attacks in one day to say that Al-Qaeda is still able to attack and threaten security posts." The most significant surge in attacks this year came on 15 August, when a series of car bombings across Iraq killed more than 80 people. An Al Qaeda statement was subsequently released to jihadist websites announcing the beginning of a campaign of attacks to avenge Bin Laden and its own slain.

A key factor behind the continued endurance of 'anti-government' groups in Iraq is the incomplete incorporation of the Sons of Iraq into the state. The strategy to 'flip' the Sunni insurgency was a key factor in reducing violence as part of the US 'surge'. In October US spokesman in Iraq Maj Gen Buchanan told me that "the original Sons of Iraq number was 100,000 and about 50,000 have transitioned, leaving 50,000 left spread across nine provinces and not all Sunni. The Iraqi government is concerned with their transition". However a senior Iraqi politician contested these figures, telling me that the militias "are now being sidelined and marginalised. Only 20% have been incorporated into the state".

If 80% of the Sons of Iraq have not been incorporated it should not come as a huge surprise to see them choosing to target the state (and its citizens) as a consequence. The fall out between Maliki and Hashimi only exacerbates the tensions between the sectarian elites that is filtering down to groups willing and able to act with devastating consequences.
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James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/
Assad has undermined the bedrock of his father's coup-proof state by marginalizing the old guard, introducing communications technology and the internet to the country, reducing funding to the military, removing the local power of Baath party committees and the unions, and, in the pursuing his version of the 'Chinese model' of economic reform, exacerbating class differences and forcing large sections of Syrian society to rely on more traditional tribal and sectarian networks.

Then, unshakable in the belief that his rule was buttressed by a legitimacy not enjoyed by other authoritarian leaders (journalists regularly come away from meeting him saying he is like no other regional leader), Bashar was initially unwilling to order the same level of force to be deployed against protestors as his father was, instead sending mixed messages of restraint to Syrian security forces whose cack-handed efforts only served to accelerate events.

When the president told ABC News that "there was no command to kill or be brutal," it only served to reflect a return of hard-line old guard and his marginalization from decision making. Ayman Abdel Nour, a media and public policy consultant who first met Assad as a college student in 1984, described Assad as living "in a cocoon," opting not to see the reports of torture and killings alleged to have occurred since mid- March. When asked "do you think that your forces cracked down too hard?" he replied, "They are not my forces; they are military forces belong to the government.... I don't own them. I am president. I don't own the country, so they are not my forces."

A former regime supporter admitted to me that this ABC interview has led to a crisis of confidence in their leader. The Syrian president has become an unwitting prisoner to his own regime and the hardliners who are directing the crackdown. He is disconnected from events and in a reality of his own, something that will only be further confirmed in each public interview he gives.

In the United Kingdom this month the British Syrian Society issued a statement saying that they are "saddened and appalled at the violence and loss of life in Syria." What is particularly interesting is that this largely culturally focused organization is co-chaired by Fawaz Akhras, a decent man who is also the father-in-law of the president. When figures this close to the president start signaling their public despair with events, you can see why the Americans describe the regime as a 'dead man walking.'

Meanwhile back in Syria the death toll is spiking at new levels with this week seeing hundreds being killed each day with reports that the regime is using sustained airpower for the first time. Syria expert Joshua Landis observed that "law and order are slowly collapsing in Syria, along with reliable supplies of basic goods and services. The opposition is becoming more capable, more numerous, and better armed; more Syrians are despairing of the Assad regime."

The unity of the military remains the most important indicator of how quickly the regime will collapse. In an August article Bashar described the army as a "model of commitment to the nation's causes and a defender of its rights, proving to be an impregnable fortress foiling the dreams and suspect plans of enemies, allowing Syria to remain a role model of national unity, amity, fraternity and coexistence". Yet despair is infecting the ranks and sources have reported that more than 10,000 soldiers have deserted the Syrian army with as many as half the conscripts not reporting in the last three call-ups. Al Jazeera reported that 72 deserters were machined gunned down in Edleb on Monday while the military continues to hold exercises to prepare "to confront any possible aggression that might target Syria's land and airspace".

This failure of Bashar's leadership represents the single biggest challenge to those in the military who hope naively that Syrian can somehow revert to the situation pre-March of this year. The opposition are very much focused on exploiting this weakness and have reportedly proposed to senior Alawites to offer Bashar immunity and safe passage out of the country in exchange for surrendering whatever power he still holds. Despite his disconnection from events, Bashar may still be aware that he is trapped in a gilded cage of his own making and choose to make the single biggest decision of his life and extract himself and his young family from the bloody mess that is Syria today.
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James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/ City of God to the episodes in Modern Warfare that place the gamer in charge of shooting their way out of the dense and mazelike warren of houses.

As with the slums in Mumbai, the ethics of whether or not to visit the favelas are hotly contested. One of our guides, a friend who has lived and worked in Rocinha for the past year producing a film, spoke of the gaggles of tourists who arrive on organized trips from their hostels to rush through the central street and gawp at the heavily armed traficos that until recently held sovereignty over the population estimated at between 150-300,000 people.

Yet times in Brazil are changing, as the B in the BRIC economies charges up the table of the world's richest countries (it is now 8th) and looks forward to hosting the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics one year later. The favelas are not immune to this transition and according to the UN study "State of the World Cities 2010/2011" Brazil has reduced its favela shantytown population by 16 percent in the last decade, with "an improvement in the living standards of 10.5 million Brazilians." According to the study, the poor living in favelas went down from 31.5 to 26.4 percent of the population.

The events of the past months however, may signal an even greater attempt at bringing the favelas into the fabric of the Brazilian state. I am of course referring to the government's decision to send in the army to a number of favelas in a series operations designed to disarm and disband the various drug cartels. I visited Rocinha just over three-weeks after the military had taken control following a highly publicized campaign warning of their arrival. The tanks have gone and instead heavily armed BOPE policemen patrol or stand at intersections dotted throughout the favelas, largely ignored by the residents in scenes reminiscent of the early days of the US occupation of Iraq.

The Brazilian authorities are keen that one of their premier tourist city's is not longer associated with rampant crime and war like levels of violence and the talk is that Rocinha may become a district of Rio rather than an independent space in and of itself. Many however see the takeovers as a cynical exercise in painting Brazil in a positive light solely for the duration of the international sporting tournaments that are coming up in the next five years. Whatever the medium term future of favelas like Rocinha, the short-term may prove paradoxically more dangerous. Why? Because the localized version of justice run by the traficos led to an incredibly low level of crime within the favelas. Even three weeks after their departure residents spoke of increasing rate of crime.

Whereas people in the past could appeal to the strong men to pass out brutal punishments, an effective deterrent apparently, the code of not speaking to the police makes their presence far less effective than their automatic weapons and combat knives suggests.

Recognizing this problem the authorities are attempting to flood the camp with a civil-police force in the coming months (the Brazilian version of British Community Support Officers), to attempt to reassure the families who often who warn their children not to leave the favela in fear of crime. The sweeteners to accompany the states full entry in Rocinha include further infrastructure development including an ambitious cable car system and attempts to control dangerous building on the sheer cliffs at the favelas periphery.

Only time will tell if the Brazilian government are committed to truly integrated the favelas into the asphalto (as the rest of the city is known) Until then residents will have to endure the uncertainty and haphazard successes and failures of the state returning like a long lost husband to care for its own population.

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James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/
Meanwhile the Arab League, famous for providing much needed regional cover for the NATO operations in Libya, is also split between those countries who argue that Assad has lost his legitimacy, led by Saudi Arabia and the GCC, and those such as Yemen and Algeria who believe that the President is the best candidate to lead a reform process in the country.

The embattled Assad has offered a shopping list of 'carrots' to appease the protestors ranging from ending the emergency law, citizenship for thousands of stateless Kurds, reformed media and political party laws, replacing the parliament, drafting a new constitution and bizarrely guaranteeing the right to peaceful protest. The use of simultaneous 'sticks', including the deployment of tanks and snipers, armed militias, mass arrests and -- according to Amnesty International and other human rights organisations -- lethal torture, has led many in the country to reject his promises as false intentions, claiming that the regime is willing to do whatever it takes to ensure that its forty-one year rule of the country is maintained.

Yet the battle to end the protests has so far been unsuccessful and, despite the heavy death toll, people are still putting themselves in the firing line to demonstrate against the regime.

Crucially however, the cities of Damascus and Aleppo, home to some 50 percent of the country's 22.5 million population, have been largely quiet. Although the cities have been flooded with security forces it remains difficult for outside observers to ascertain whether Syria's silent majority favour the uncertainties of the post-Assad era over the devil they know. As Marwa Daoudy recently wrote, 'the situation has now reached a stalemate. Neither side appears to be able to defeat the other.'

So is Syria trapped in a bloody inertia? Can the regime survive or will pressure from both inside and outside the country see Assad join Mubarak, Ben Ali and Gaddafi as another casualty of the Arab Spring?

Multilateralism Can Be Effective

The first point to make is that although multilateralism has failed so far that does not mean it won't find its voice in the future. Indeed as the death toll increases the regime may discover that its backers at the UN and in the Arab League find it impossible to maintain their defence of its actions.

A senior Russian official has come out and said that the current Russian support for Syria is not a 'blank cheque'. Meanwhile the Arab League could yet play a role. The League's stated purpose is to strengthen ties among the member states, coordinate their policies, and promote their common interests. Although the Arab Spring is far from dying down it is inevitable that the changes throughout the region will force a re-evaluation of the common interests of the member states, who will find that democratic accountability will mean a myriad of new demands from their populations.

I was maybe a bit harsh when I described the League as 'not fit for purpose' on Al Jazeera this week, the true test will come after the 15-day deadline on the Syrian government to stop its operations against anti-government protesters expires.

Economic Pressures

As clashes continue, the Syrian economy continues to nosedive. A new report by Geopolicity revealed that the Arab uprisings had cost the region $50bn with Egypt, Syria and Libya having paid the highest financial price. Yet Mohammed Jleilati, Syria's finance minister, claims that Syria has $18 billion in foreign currency reserves and could secure all of its imports for two years 'if not a single other dollar came.' However there can be little doubt that the Syrian economy is struggling to breathe under the constrictions that have been placed upon it. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted last month that Syria's economy would contract 2 percent this year, altering the 3 percent growth forecast it issued in April. The Syrian government is in the process of transferring millions out of accounts in Jordanian banks, having restricted the amount of foreign currency people can purchase and banned the import of goods with a tariff of more than 5 percent (except 51 items including raw materials and grain), which has led to a rise in the price of a huge range of products. The Guardian has also reported that workers at the Central Bank of Syria have been asked to 'contribute' about £6.50 per month from their salary to fund the government.

Meanwhile tourism, worth an estimated £5 billion a year, has entirely collapsed as the rising death toll has scared tourists away from what was previously a rapidly flourishing destination. In addition, sources in the shipping industry say that the volume of shipping in the ports of Tartus and Latakia declined by 35 to 40 percent in the first eight months of 2011. Overall the economic situation is bleak, but as Chris Doyle, director of the Council for Arab-British Understanding (CAABU), explained 'Syria is a relatively wealthy country so it will take some time for a real deterioration in people's living standards.' Doyle spoke of the more immediate concern of besieged cities such as Hama, Dera'a and Homs, which have been under intermittent attack since the protests began.

The Spectre of Civil War

Former-EU Foreign Policy chief Javier Solana described the Syrian opposition's formation of a 'Syrian National Council' (SNC) in October as the 'most important step yet taken by the fragmented forces that have been trying since May to lead a peaceful uprising against President Bashar al-Assad's regime'. The opposition, faced with the difficult task of uniting disparate factions inside and outside the country, could play an important interlocutor role that could better engage global institutions.

However while the SNC has endorsed the peaceful and non-violent nature of the protests there are increasing reports of people taking up arms against the regime, a development that could signal the transition from civil strife to civil war. Indeed, United Nations high commissioner for human rights Navi Pillay has said that Syria risked 'a full-blown civil war' unless the international community took action.

Since the start of the protests the regime has regularly blamed armed 'terrorists' acting on a 'foreign agenda' for the deaths, claiming that over 1,100 security officers have been killed. Any observer of Syrian state news will see regular reports of arms caches discovered, the President visiting wounded soldiers or captured 'terrorists' confessing their crimes.

Last week the state-run Lebanese National News Agency reported that Lebanese soldiers uncovered a cache of machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades hidden inside a van driving towards Syria. Where were these weapons destined for? A new player on the scene is the Syrian Free Army, whose defecting soldiers have been fighting loyal regime forces in the city of Rastan. Little is known about this group led by Colonel Riyadh al-Asaad but their emergence is evidence of the difference in approaches to overthrowing the regime adopted by the various opposition groups.

The continued loyalty and actions of the Syrian security forces will remain a key barometer of future events in Syria. In Tunisia and Egypt the military essentially abandoned the top echelons of the regimes in the face of public protest. In Libya and to some extent Yemen, the loyalty of large parts of the security forces led to the breakout of civil war and, in the case of Libya, a soaring death toll (over 10,000).

Unless the international community proves that it has the stomach to agree on the need to halt Syria's current bloodshed they may find themselves with the far harder task of managing the consequence of a civil war in future. Such a conflict will certainly have a range of knock-on effects and will raise real questions over state collapse, sectarianism and prolonged instability. To prevent such a disastrous tomorrow the world must come together to demand an end to violence today.

James Denselow is a Director of the independent research institution the 'New Diplomacy Platform'
]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.997669 2011-10-06T13:03:35-04:00 2011-12-06T05:12:02-05:00

James Denselow http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-denselow/ The Other Side of the Mirror (Brooke Allen, Paul Dry Books -- Philadelphia 2011)

Brooke Allen, an American critical writer, attempts in this book the ambitious task of writing a travelogue that opens up the closed state of Syria to an American public. Sadly, what Allen has created is a fragmented, superficial and deeply flawed foray into Syria that, considering the great potential of the task, is disappointing.

Although featuring sections of history and political commentary, the book reads much like a holiday diary. Much of the 248 page work comprises chunks of quotations ranging from Mark Twain to T. E Lawrence and a number of postcard-like pictures of Syria's greatest tourist attractions. What's more, the Syria that Allen describes is almost completely devoid of real characters. With no Arabic language skills to enable her to converse with Syrian people, the majority of the author's encounters are with workers in the tourist trade. Allen admits to having 'untutored eyes' and one wonders how much you can really learn from an author whose book is based on seemingly only two short trips to the country.

Allen has chosen a thematic structure to examine Syria through frameworks such as time, faith and ruins. She admits that the book is a 'series of traveller's impressions,' but the structure means that the reader is taken from one corner of the country to another in a matter of paragraphs and, crucially, the sense of travel is entirely lost. That said, the author has obviously read extensively around the subject and the book includes some strong sections on the historical context of Syria's many magnificent Crusader castles.

Allen is, however, perhaps the most innocent of innocents abroad, setting out in the early chapters the stark dichotomy between the Syria she believes that Americans perceive and the actual experience. This leads to bold statements such as "most Westerners are under the impression that Syrians are fanatically Muslim," and you feel that perhaps only an American with no knowledge of Syria at all can be the proper judge of the work. At several points in the book, Allen expresses her surprise that Syrians are not instantly hostile to her and you feel that after her trips she has undergone only a transition from absolute to relative ignorance. Many sections of the book are also deeply patronising, such as Allen's lazy referral to her drivers as Muhammed one, two, three and four, and the constant highlighting of translation and spelling errors on restaurant menus.

Having lived in Syria around the time Allen was writing, I did not recognise much of the book's description of the country. While some mistakes, such as thinking that there are no ATMs in Syria, are forgivable, much less so is Allen's rose-tinted conclusion that living in the police state isn't as bad as people would think. The 2011 uprisings and the brutal attempts to put it down have made the timing of Allen's book somewhat tragic, as Syria's emerging $5bn tourist industry has more or less collapsed. The author is surprised by the 'genuine enthusiasm' for their dictatorial leader and later argues that 'Syrians seem to have developed a far more civil and polite public arena than our own.' While Allen wrote the book prior to the March 2011 outbreak of protests her stance that the 'jury is still out' on Assad is very much out of date as today much of the world has now made the decision that he must go.

Allen's whistle-stop foray into the history, culture and politics of Syria contains nuggets of interest but ultimately falls wide of the mark, leaving an unfilled space for a heavyweight account of travels from this currently tortured country.

www.jamesdenselow.com
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