2013-05-21T14:27:37-04:00 Paul Reynolds http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/author/index.php?author=paul-reynolds Copyright 2008, HuffingtonPost.com, Inc. HuffingtonPost Blogger Feed for Paul Reynolds Good old fashioned elbow grease. tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.3137515 2013-04-23T06:34:42-04:00 2013-04-23T09:09:48-04:00

Paul Reynolds http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-reynolds/
The same family have been in power in Djibouti since independence from France. The increasingly luxurious lifestyle of the President's entourage has been criticised by international aid institutions, such as the use of a new Boeing 767 as 'the family's private jet' and the construction of outrageously lavish palaces for relatives. Having changed the constitution allowing himself to be President for life, President Guelleh then expelled election monitors sent by the US State Department to oversee Presidential elections. He banned foreign observers, refused entry to respected journalists, and engaged in widespread manipulation of voter lists.

With a population of under a million and an electorate of only 200,000 citizens, Djibouti has been home to a large French military base since independence in 1973. It is also home to an expanding multi-agency US base, 'Camp Lemonnier'.

Djibouti's economy is based on its strategic location at the narrow entrance to the Red Sea, leading to the Suez Canal. Its ports provide maritime trade access for landlocked Ethiopia. Djibouti also receives several hundred millions of dollars a year income from foreign military bases, and is favoured with generous US, French and EU aid.

Whilst in aggregate a middle-income country, the general population live in dire poverty. Djibouti has one of the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in Africa. Much of the population has no reliable access to clean water or electricity. Ports in Djibouti have to recruit abroad to find the skills they need, despite unemployment at home of 60%. Today, 50,000 people receive aid from the World Food Programme. Women face serious discrimination. A recent IMF survey warned that 'growth has thus far not succeeded in significantly reducing poverty or unemployment'. The country ranked 147th out of 169 countries in the UNDP's Human Development Index for 2010, and malnutrition has risen.

Investment has dried up in the wake of confiscations and arbitrary taxes. According to the World Bank, Djibouti is one of the worst countries in the world in which to do business, ranked 170th out of 183 countries. Economic deprivation in the wake of profligacy at the top is one key cause of instability. Another is the government's appalling human rights record. Large numbers were detained and mistreated during last year's Presidential elections. Prominent human rights and opposition activists were arrested, including leaders of the four main opposition parties. Demonstrations against the election process in February 2011 were met with tear gas and violence.

Detention of government critics has persisted. Jean-Paul Noël Abdi, president of the Djiboutian League of Human Rights, was also arrested in Feb 2012 for his reporting on the demonstrations. He was released from prison 12 days later, but the charges remained. Also arrested for insurrection in early February were six reporters and informants for the opposition radio station La Voix de Djibouti. Held for over four months, and then placed under judicial control. In addition popular radio journalist Farah Abadid Hildid was abducted by police, stripped naked, and kept in a cell without water, the third time in a year he had been detained. This has been referred to the to the United Nations special rapporteur on torture.

The National Assembly elections of 22nd Feb 2013 precipitated renewed mass demonstrations, with credible video footage supporting opposition claims of more than 100,000 on the streets - extraordinary when one takes into account the fact that the electorate is only twice that figure. A wave of arrests of human rights activists before the National Assembly elections was internationally reported, but not the wave of detentions and torture that followed the elections. Opposition figures remain in detention.

After the elections twenty-six police refused to fire on crowds of civilians and joined the demonstrators. Demonstrations continue weeks after the elections and tear gas is often deployed. Demonstrators now are calling for the release of detained opposition leaders and human rights activists as well as a re-run of elections.

The opposition have now established an 'Alternative National Assembly' which will reflect the combined opposition to President Guelleh. The new Assembly has begun operating and it should receive the same pro-democracy support as the alternative structures established in Syria.

The current Western 'devil-you-know' approach may result in yet another messy, unstable factionalised state. President Guelleh's visit to London should remind Western policymakers of the need to review Horn of Africa policy.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.2943936 2013-03-25T19:00:00-04:00 2013-03-25T18:47:08-04:00

Paul Reynolds http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-reynolds/
It was a dangerous time - there was gunfire everywhere and Saddams's secret police (Mukhabarat) were zooming around in fast cars, up to mayhem. Visiting mosques with special UK forces, and the notorious 'Shia Flats', and being shot at in my unescorted 4WD Galloper, was indeed a harrowing experience. As probably the only civilian off out on daily excursions to negotiate with various groups, I saw the post-war reality. To be blunt I was lucky to exit mostly unscathed, especially after being caught twice in the middle of an angry and armed crowd of more than a thousand in my car with only hand weapons. However, the process of appointing a provincial governorate, using the full range of 'tricks up my sleeve', was successful, and we went on at our first meeting to elect a governor - with the help of an old generator borrowed from a former ice cream parlour. Other provinces took lessons from the success. The organisation in Basra survived almost intact until the elections (one assassination).

I had other tasks in Iraq - helping to organise the physical infrastructure (mostly electricity and water), and developing the 'rule-of-law infrastructure' (We found some CDs listing hundreds of laws, in a bombed-out Saddam era TV studio). In addition I was a contributor to the constitutional development process. On each of these three sets of processes, I encountered much more than a lack of planning - it was more a case of astonishing wildly vaccilating policy on the big issues... when the local, regional and national elections should be, the role of occupier-decrees versus extant legislation (vital for the courts being opened), the extent of support for diaspora versus Saddam era anti-Ba'athist political groups, the extent to which secret negotiations with Ba'athists should play a role, the extent to which we should allow/resist exceptionalism in the Kurdish areas, what to do with oil and frozen-assets money, and indeed how far everyone should continue with the obviously specious WMD game and the al Qaeda game.

What's more, we had capacity problems because there was an informal process of veto-ing those of the wrong political persuasion (eg "lefty, tree-hugging US Democrats" as one colleague put it). By contrast we had too much money and we had to find ways to get it out into the population instead of the pockets of well-connected mega-contractors. I even created a special fund for ex-soldiers who had had one ear cut off for not fighting in the Iran-Iraq war. Near my desk there were pallets and pallets of US dollars, all nicely shrink-wrapped, in excess of $100million in cash at one point.

But I recall these events with a heavy heart - first the personal one, since many of my UK, US and Iraqi colleagues died, and I always tried to loook into the faces of corpses on the street and wonder about their lives. Then the political one, for all the fatalities... the narrow semi-official hospital figures (somewhat massaged), the Iraqi 'body count' numbers, the wider fatality estimates, and then the calculations as to how many people would be alive today if the war had not taken place, given the number the Ba'athists would have killed in the meantime (this is well over a million).

How do I feel about it now ?

I've worked in other conflict areas - Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda. In Iraq everyone privately knew the WMD thing was a pretext, and this assumption underpinned all our political work. No-one was 100% certain of the real aims. Still today. So we made it up. Now I understand the real aims perhaps too well, but my assumption then, not shared by some key diplomats, was that stability and a structural political-legal & social legacy that reduced the likelihood of descent into sectarianism and tribalism, was the key. It should be remembered that when I first brought together the members of the provincial government I had appointed in Basra, many appointees know each other well, but some did not know which tribe they belonged to and whether they were Shia or Sunni.

My overarching conclusions are three-fold. First, that colonially-created states held together by Western or Russian backed dictators are 'Humpty-Dumpty Nations' - they can be broken for sure if killing hundreds of thousands of folk is seen as OK, but cannot be put together again except by enormous effort, unity of purpose, and dep, deep local knowledge on the ground. [Please not regarding Syria]. Second, layers of hidden aims of the Western military powers, leading to wars which kill millions with hidden aims, will require increasing authoritarianism within the Western nations - destroying our main economic, political and ultimately our military strengths. Third, the slippery slope starts with allowing the military take over our Western foreign policy. It may be too late to reverse these factors.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.1772292 2012-08-13T09:18:02-04:00 2012-10-13T05:12:11-04:00

Paul Reynolds http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-reynolds/
An announcement by the UK Foreign Secretary that financial and material support will be channelled to the opposition signals more loudly that the West's is siding with anti-regime groups both inside and outside the country. But is the UK and its allies, primarily France, Turkey and the USA, really ready for a regime collapse ? The opposition in Syria is understandably only loosely unified, and supported by a mix of countries with differing motives and interests. For example, do Saudi Arabia, France and Israel share the same vision for a future Syria ? Certainly they do not.

One can hope that Western security and military institutions have learned from Iraq and Afghanistan that regimes like Syria - somewhat artificial colonial creations - are fragile as nation-states. Such regimes survive by evolving a combination of brute force, hoarding of economic power internally and 'divide-and-bribe', with delicate balancing of external interests.

Syria itself has been assisted by the Soviets/Russians for decades - both militarily and in building its fear-based security state. The (militarily insignificant) Russian base at Tartus is of more benefit to Syria than to Russia, especially after President Putin unwisely made it a macho symbol of resurgent Russian power.

A consequence of these features is that Syria is another 'Humpty Dumpty state' - once it breaks it is extremely challenging to put it back together again, since age-old regional rivalries will result in different groups vying for power with different external backers - a recipe for a decade-long insurgency after the regime collapses, with echoes of Iraq and Afghanistan.

However the Western strategy, co-led by the UK, appears to be to work alongside Turkey and Gulf states, and wait for regime collapse, rather than cut a deal with Russia and China, and bringing in Gulf states and Syria's neighbours. One reason that this is dangerous, is that even Western policy is currently divided. Whilst the US State Dept is deploring civilian deaths and advocating democracy, US military and security officials, and Israel, are emphasising the risks of terrorism and the need to secure WMD inside Syria - creating two conflicting potential bases for external intervention. Attempting to dovetail the Syrian uprising with the 'war-on-terror' narrative, albeit tortuously, is likely to lead to conflicting Western aims.

Thus the UK is reduced to pursuing the only common denominator among its allies and anti-regime supporting countries - the fall of the Ba'athist Asad regime by whatever means. It is easy to see how the 'wait for the collapse' strategy of the UK is likely to lead to a long post-Asad tribal/sectarian conflict.

Alternatively, a deal needs to be prepared for a post-Asad Syria which will endure in the long run. This should probably include a new decentralised constitutional settlement with pluralism enshrined but exceptionalism ruled out, and a political system that does not exclude any one major grouping. It may include guarantees for the Russian base at Tartus, and a revival of freer trade arrangements with neighbours to ensure economic growth. Such an approach is, perhaps ironically, the most effective at ensuring that Syria is not a safe haven for non-state military actors.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.1377369 2012-03-26T19:00:00-04:00 2012-05-26T05:12:01-04:00

Paul Reynolds http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-reynolds/
The general impression given by 'Western' news reporting lines on the issue is that Iran is intent on developing a nuclear weapon, but this simply hasn't been proven yet because Iran has been concealing its accelerating nuclear weaponisation activities, and soon they will be so deep underground that they will be militarily impenetrable. Hence the apparent urgency - and the prospect of a third and fourth IAEA delegation visit within two months.

This narrative lies behind the US, UK and French military build up around Iran - in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Azerbaijan, Djibouti and Bahrain, on the islands of Socotra and Masirah, and in the waters off the coast of Iran. It also underpins the drive towards blockade-type economic sanctions which will apply from 1 July 2012. The logic is that by applying economic and military pressure, the Iranian regime will be forced to negotiate to give up its nuclear weapons programme, cease uranium enrichment to 20%, and allow more intrusive IAEA inspections.

Is this 'pro-war' narrative supported by the facts, or does it have elements similar to those from 2002 over Iraq? Is there a campaign to go to war regardless, and are the facts being fixed around the policy? If the latter, then the implication is that the blockade-type sanctions and the military build up are simply preparations for war, rather than part of a complex negotiating strategy. Unfortunately it does look that way if the hard facts are contrasted with the information which is fed to the media by military and security institutions on both sides of the Atlantic.

However the Iran situation is very different to Iraq. Obama and his top military and security appointees are against war with Iran, and state quite clearly that, based on information from all top US intel agencies, Iran is not building a nuclear weapon. They go further and state that Iran has not made any decision to do so in the future, has not diverted any nuclear material, and is currently enriching uranium ton 20% for civilian purposes.

Obama's Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta, and his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, have both warned Israel that if they try and drag the US into a war with Iran, by attacking unilaterally, it will not work, and the US will not 'complete the job' (Israel cannot complete such a mission on its own).

What is astonishing to most politicians in the UK and the rest of Europe is that a campaign for war is being pursued on an global basis by some institutions in the US, with the support of the Israeli leadership, against the wishes of the President and his top military, security and diplomatic officials. Indeed, it is widely concluded that the campaign to go war with Iran is as much about engineering an Obama defeat in this years elections than it is about stopping Iran from weaponising its nuclear capability.

There are some tell-tale signs that help to clarify this.

First, Iran was first accused of developing a nuclear weapon in 1982, when it was predicted to have a deliverable weapon by 1984. In 1984 Jane's Defence Weekly announced that Iran would have a bomb by 1986. This pattern has been repeated many times since, until 2009 when the 'bomb-in-two-years' story flashed across everyone's news screens again.

The news narrative following the latest (8 Nov 2011) IAEA report reflected again this repeated accusation. However, the report itself in effect concurred with the USA's 2007 and 2010 combined intel reports (NIEs), that the Iranians gave up their fledgling weaponisation programme in 2003.

Second, the 8 November IAEA report referred to some additional concerns arising from new information about nuclear weapons development at the site where Iran develops its conventional longer range missiles - Parchin, a site visited by IAEA inspectors a number of times. This information (since ridiculed by US experts) was said to have originated from a laptop obtained by the IAEA via Israel - a laptop that was not available for independent verification. It was Parchin that the Iranian's are alleged, controversially, to have refused an IAEA visit in February. The 'Parchin affair, looks very similar to events in the run up to Iraq war.

These manoeuvrings are reflected in the UK, with hawkish tones coming from the UK Foreign Secretary - who said 'There can be no plausible civilian explanation for Iran's nuclear enrichment' - but PM Cameron more recently reflecting the White House line and warning Israel that there can be no justification at present for an attack.

Will there be an Israeli attack before the new blockade sanctions apply on 1 July 2012, or a US/UK attack after? It depends who wins the argument. Given the devastating effect that such a war will have on the world economy and in loss of life, it is worth keeping one's eye on the manoeuvrings in Washington DC and London. We can only await new negotiations and for the Iranians to ratify the 'Additional IAEA Protocol' and allow more extensive inspections.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.1287701 2012-02-19T19:00:00-05:00 2012-04-20T05:12:01-04:00

Paul Reynolds http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-reynolds/
Djibouti is home to a large French military base. It is also home to an expanding multi-agency US base, 'Camp Lemonnier', about to undergo its next phase of development in the wake of events in Iran, Somalia, Syria and Yemen.

Djibouti is host to negotiations over Somalia's future, and the to training of Somali soldiers supporting the fragile Transitional Federal Government (TFG) based in Mogadishu. A further 'Western' feather in President Guelleh's cap is the arrival in Somalia last month of 500 Djibouti soldiers to join troops supporting the TFG under the AMISOM UN mandate.

What's more, on the face of it, the Djibouti economy looks in good condition. The IMF estimates economic growth of 4.6% in 2011 and projects 5.3% in 2012.

Djibouti's economy is based on its strategic location at the narrow entrance to the Red Sea, leading to the Suez Canal. Its Dubai-invested ports provide maritime trade access for landlocked Ethiopia. Djibouti receives several hundred millions of dollars a year income from foreign military bases, and is favoured with generous aid. Its economic future looks bright 'on paper' also - the Chinese are re-building the railway to Ethiopia; two countries also cooperating in a planned oil pipeline from newly-independent South Sudan.

Despite all this, all is not well in Djibouti.

Under cover of 'Western' support, the regime has become more dictatorial and volatile, the more invincible it believes itself to be. It could easily be overthrown, with unpredictable consequences and the possibility of intervention from Eritrea, Ethiopia or even Somali Al Shabaab. The US and Europe appear unprepared for any of this, preferring to put all their eggs in one basket - and in the hope that the President's failing health does not test the absence of a viable secession strategy.

The same family and party have been in power since independence from France. The increasingly luxurious lifestyle of the President's entourage has been criticised by international aid institutions, such as the use of a new Boeing 767 as 'the family's private jet' and the construction of outrageously lavish palaces for relatives. Having changed the constitution allowing himself to be President for life, and having blocked opposition candidates from standing against him for the April 2011 election, President Guelleh then expelled election monitors sent by the US State Department. He banned foreign observers, refused entry to respected journalists, and engaged in widespread manipulation of voter lists.

Whilst in aggregate a middle-income country, the general population live in dire poverty. Djibouti has one of the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in Africa. Much of the population has no reliable access to clean water or electricity. Ports in Djibouti have to recruit abroad to find the skills they need, despite unemployment at home of 60%. Today, 52,000 people receive aid from the World Food Programme.

The latest IMF survey warned that 'growth has thus far not succeeded in significantly reducing poverty or unemployment. The country ranked 147th out of 169 countries in the UNDP's Human Development Index for 2010, and malnutrition has risen.

Investment has dried up in the wake of confiscations and arbitrary taxes. Even relations with Dubai investors have deteriorated. According to the World Bank, Djibouti is one of the worst countries in the world in which to do business, ranked 170th out of 183 countries.

Economic deprivation in the wake of profligacy at the top is one potential trigger of instability. Another is the government's appalling human rights record.

Large numbers were detained and mistreated during last year's Presidential elections. Prominent human rights and opposition activists were arrested, including leaders of the four main opposition parties. Demonstrations against the election process in February 2011 were met with tear gas and violence. Detention of government critics has persisted - on 3 February this year popular radio journalist Farah Abadid Hildid was abducted by police, stripped naked, and kept in a cell without water, the third time in a year he has been detained. This has been referred to the to the United Nations special rapporteur on torture.

Is it wise to support this callous and kleptocratic dictatorship because it is friendly with the 'West'? British officials should be properly aware of the background and the risks. It will be in Britain's interest to promote a more cautious approach to President Guelleh, as part of its Somalia and Horn of Africa peace policy. Propping up deeply unpopular dictators has a habit of leaving the UK on the wrong side of the argument.]]>