by Richard Freeman, author of 'A Close-Run Thing: The Navy & The Falklands War'.
As we approach the thirtieth anniversary of the Falklands War - which started on 2 April 1982 - Britain's victory is justly recalled. That the war came near to disaster is conveniently forgotten. How well-placed are we to hold the islands today?
When the 127 ships of the Task Force - a number that could not be assembled now - returned in triumph to the home ports in 1982 no one wished to talk about how near the venture had come to grief. Without detracting from the courage and skill of the British forces, victory came because of three unpredictable weaknesses on the Argentine side: they ran out of Exocet missiles; many of their 1000lb bombs failed to explode; and they foolishly attacked the warships instead of the troop transports at San Carlos Bay. But for these flukes the rate of attrition on British warships would soon have passed tipping point.
Another crucial factor that is conveniently forgotten is how handicapped the Task Force was by Britain being a member of NATO. Her forces were equipped and trained to work alongside the Americans. Alone in the South Atlantic, crucial systems were lacking. Notably (and this cost many ships and lives) there was no airborne early warning system. And, just as fatally, the ships working close to the shore had no shore-based radar or missile systems for their protection.
All in all, in the glory days of 1982 the country took the Navy for granted and little knew just how pared down it was. So what of today as naval vessels become daily rarer?
That the Argentine threat is ever present is an inescapable fact. (Although one would not think so on reading the threats to Britain identified in the National Security Strategy: counter terrorism, cyber security, international military crisis and national disasters.) While in 1982 Argentina's main reason for taking the islands was hurt pride, today they have a real and potent motive: oil. The reserves - 'enough to pay off the national debt' - are staggeringly large. It is inconceivable that Argentina is going to sit out the next 20-50 years and watch Britain take the lot without making a move. She has already sought to persuade members of the South American common market to close their ports to British ships; she wants an Argentine monopoly of civilian flights into Port Stanley; she has turned away cruise ships ... and so it goes on. We should recall that Mrs Thatcher fatally misread Argentina's provocations of late 1981 and early 1982. Are we set to repeat that error?
The current defence of the islands relies on deterrence. If an attack should be threatened, the not inconsiderable forces there would be reinforced via the improved runway. This runway is the Achilles' heel of the plan. If it were to be blocked or damaged, all would depend, as in 1982, on the Navy. And what could the Navy do now?
What about a carrier or two? That's fine if we are prepared to wait until 2020, or possibly even 2027.
What about some Joint Strike Fighters in place of the magnificent Sea Harriers sold to the Americans last year? There's not much hope there: the new planes are unable to land on a carrier, even if we had one!
The situation is so dire that the commander of the Falklands Task Force, Admiral Sir John Woodward recently said that 'The best we can do for an expeditionary force is a day trip to France.' We are also confidently told by General Sir Michael Jackson that, should the Argentines take the islands, it would be impossible to retake them.
In a nutshell, current defence policy is a shambles. Perhaps Argentina will bring that point home to us.
Richard Freeman is the author of Richard Freeman, author of 'A Close-Run Thing: The Navy & The Falklands War' published by Endeavour Press